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Abstract We classify and analyze bit errors in the 
current measurement mode of the Kirchhoff-law–
Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution. The error 
probability decays exponentially with increasing bit 
exchange period and fixed bandwidth, which is 
similar to the error probability decay in the voltage 
measurement mode. We also analyze the combination 
of voltage and current modes for error removal. In 
this combination method, the error probability is still 
an exponential function that decays with the duration 
of the bit exchange period, but it has superior fidelity 
to the former schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
Information theoretic security, often referred to as 
“unconditional security” [1], means that the security 
measures are determined by information theory or, in 
physical systems, by measurement theory. These 
security measures can be perfect or imperfect and are 
determined by the eavesdropper’s (“Eve’s”) supposed 
optimum conditions for extracting the maximum 
amount of information. In other words, Eve’s 
information is calculated by assuming that she has 
unlimited computational power and that her 
measurement accuracy and measurement speed are 
limited only by the laws of physics and the protocol’s 
conditions. 
 Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] was the 
first scheme based on the laws of physics that 
claimed to possess unconditional security. However, 
this claim is not uncontested and there is an ongoing 
debate [3–7] about the security inherent in existing 
QKD schemes. This discussion was initiated by 
quantum security experts Horace Yuen [3–4, 7] and 
Osamu Hirota [5], who agreed in their claim that the 
achievable level of security in QKD schemes is 
questionable. Renner [6] later entered this debate to 
defend the foundations of quantum cryptography and 
to validate existing security proofs.  
From a practical point of view one observes that 
several communicators, including commercial and 
laboratory-type QKD devices, have been successfully 
cracked, as shown in numerous publications [8–22]. 
These demonstrated flaws of the QKD devices—and 
also some practical issues such as limited 
communication range and high price—have inspired 
new initiatives that involve non-QKD schemes 
utilizing alternative types of mechanisms to achieve 
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security [23, 24]. 
 
Recent studies have shown that a system 
employing two pairs of resistors, with Gaussian 
voltage noise generators to imitate and enhance their 
Johnson noise, can be used for secure key distribution 
[25–30]. This system is known as the Kirchhoff-law–
Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution and 
provides information theoretic security [26, 27]. It is 
based on Kirchhoff’s loop law of quasi-
electrodynamics and the fluctuation–dissipation 
theorem of statistical physics [25–31]. The KLJN 
scheme has potential applications including physical 
uncloneable function hardware keys [32]; 
unconditional security within computers, hardware 
and other instruments [32, 33]; and unconditionally 
secure smart grids [34–36]. 
Figure 1 shows the fundamental KLJN system 
[25–30] without defense elements against active 
(invasive) attacks and vulnerabilities represented by 
non-ideal building elements. Under practical 
conditions, this system utilizes enhanced Johnson 
noise with high noise temperature, obtained from 
Gaussian noises generated electronically so that 
quasi-static and thermodynamic characteristics are 
emulated as accurately as possible, in order to 
approach perfect security [31]. The core KLJN 
channel is represented by a wire line to which the two 
communicating parties, “Alice” and “Bob”, connect 
their resistors AR  and BR , respectively. These 
resistors are randomly selected from the set  0 1,R R  
, with 0 1R R . The resistor 0R  indicates the low (0) 
bit and the resistor 
1R  indicates 
the high (1) bit, 
respectively [25]. At the beginning of each clock 
period or bit exchange period, Alice and Bob, who 
have identical pairs of resistors, randomly choose one 
of these resistors and connect it to the wire line. The 
Gaussian voltage noise generators represent either the 
Johnson noises of the resistors or external noise 
generators delivering band-limited white noise with 
publicly known bandwidth and effective noise 
temperature 
effT  [25–26, 30]. According to the 
fluctuation–dissipation theorem, the enhanced 
Johnson noise voltages of  Alice’s and Bob’s 
resistors—denoted ( )Au t  and ( )Bu t  respectively, 
where  0, 1,( ), ( )A A Au u t u t  and  0, 1,( ), ( )B B Bu u t u t
—generate a channel noise voltage ( )cu t  between the 
wire line and  ground as well as a channel noise 
current ( )ci t  in the wire.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Outline of the core KLJN secure key exchange 
scheme without defense circuitry (current/voltage 
monitoring/comparison) against invasive attacks or attacks 
utilizing non-ideal components and conditions. effT  is the 
effective noise temperature, 
AR , ( )Au t , BR , and ( )Bu t  
are the resistor values and noise voltages at Alice and Bob, 
respectively. ( )cu t  and ( )ci t  
are channel noise voltage and 
current, respectively. 
 
 Within the bit exchange period, Alice and Bob 
measure the mean-square channel noise voltage 
and/or current amplitudes 2 ( )cu t   and/or 
2 ( )ci t . By 
applying Johnson’s noise formula and Kirchhoff’s 
loop law, it follows that the theoretical values of the 
mean-square noise voltage and current for a given 
channel noise bandwidth KLJNB  and temperature effT  
are [25, 26]  
2
, ||( ) ( ) 4c u c KLJN eff KLJNu t S f B kT R B   ,        (1a) 
2
,
1
( ) ( ) 4c i c KLJN eff KLJN
loop
i t S f B kT B
R
  .            (1b)
 
Here  represents ideal infinite-time average, 
, ( )u cS f  is the power density spectrum of the channel 
voltage noise, 
, ( )i cS f  is the power density spectrum 
of channel current noise, k  is Boltzmann’s constant, 
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|| / ( )A B A BR R R R R  , and loop A BR R R  .  
 The resistance values 
||R  and/or loopR  can be 
publicly known by comparing the result of the 
measurement of the mean-square channel noise 
voltage and/or current amplitudes with the 
corresponding theoretical values obtained from Eq. 
(1). Alice and Bob know their own chosen resistors, 
and hence the total resistances 
||R  and/or loopR  allow 
them to deduce the resistance value and actual bit 
status at the other end of the wire. 
 The cases when Alice and Bob use the same 
resistance values—i.e., the 00 and 11 situations—
represent non-secure bit exchange. Eve will then be 
able to find the resistor values, their location and the 
status of the bits, because the total resistance will 
either be the lowest or the highest value of the three 
possible magnitudes of the total resistance. The 
situations when Alice and Bob use the resistance 
values 01 and 10 signify a secure bit exchange event 
because these resistances cannot be distinguished by 
measured mean-square values. Alice and Bob will 
know that the other party has the inverse of his/her 
bit, which implies that a secure key exchange takes 
place. 
 The KLJN key distribution scheme has statistical 
errors due to the finite duration time   of the bit-
exchange period [30, 31]. Specifically, an 
experimental demonstration of the KLJN scheme, 
conducted recently by Mingesz et al. [30], yielded 
that the fidelity of the KLJN key exchange was 99.98 
%, corresponding to a bit error probability of 0.02 %. 
 The bit errors were analyzed recently by Saez 
and Kish [31] for the case of the mean square noise 
voltage being utilized for key exchange. The bit error 
probability showed exponential decay vs.   .In the 
present paper we analyze the bit errors in the current 
measurement mode, and we also analyze the 
combination of voltage and current modes for error 
mitigation. 
 
2 Bit interpretation of the measured channel 
current 
We suppose ideal components/conditions and 
proceed as in earlier work [31]. Alice and Bob obtain 
the total loop resistance by measuring the mean-
square channel noise current amplitude 
2 ( )ci t 
,
 
where 

 indicates a finite-time average over 
random fluctuations around the exact mean-square 
noise current. Figure 2 illustrates the three possible 
levels of the measured mean-square channel noise 
current. The 11, 01/10 and 00 bit situations result in 
mean-square channel noise currents 
2
11( )i t 
, 
2
01/10 ( )i t 
 and 2
00 ( )i t 
, respectively.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Illustration of statistical fluctuations of the finite-
time mean-square current levels around their mean values 
for the 11, 01/10 and 00 bit situations. The scales are 
arbitrary. Solid lines denote exact (infinite) time average 
results. 
3  and 4  are thresholds for bit interpretation.  
 
 Thresholds determine the boundaries between 
the different interpretations of the measured mean-
square channel voltages [31]. In the present paper, we 
use threshold values 
3  and 4  to interpret the 
measured mean-square channel current over the time 
window  , as indicated in Fig. 2. The interpretation 
is 11 when 
2 2
11 3( ) ( )ci t i t
   , and 00 when 
2 2
00 4( ) ( )ci t i t
   , respectively. The secure case 
01/10 is interpreted as such when 
2 2 2
11 3 00 4( ) ( ) ( )ci t i t i t
    . In earlier work 
[31], the corresponding voltage-based threshold 
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values 1  and 2  were chosen, for normalization 
purposes, to be proportional to the related mean-
square voltages, namely,  
2
1 00 ( )Du t   with 0 1   and 
2
2 11( )Du t    with 0 1  , for the bit 
situations 00 and 11, respectively. We choose 
3  and 
4  in a similar way below. 
 
3 Error probabilities due to statistical 
inaccuracies in noise current measurements 
Bit errors occur when the protocol makes incorrect 
bit interpretations due to statistical inaccuracies in the 
measured mean square noise current, and an error 
analysis for voltage-based operation was presented 
before [31]. There are different types of error 
situations, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Types of errors in the KLJN bit exchange scheme 
for voltage-based operation [31]. 
  Actual Situation 
  00 11 01/10 
M
e
a
su
r
e
m
e
n
t 
In
te
r
p
r
e
ta
ti
o
n
 
(D
e
c
is
io
n
) 
 
 
00 
Correct 
Error 
removed 
(automatic) 
Error 
removed 
(automatic) 
11 
Error 
removed 
(automatic) 
Correct 
 
Error 
removed 
(automatic) 
 
 
01/10 
 
Error * Error * Correct 
*The paper addresses these errors and their probability. 
 
 Similarly to the voltage-based case [31], two 
types of errors need to be addressed for current-based 
measurements: the 11==>01/10 errors, i.e., errors 
when the actual situation 11 is interpreted as 01/10, 
and the 00==>01/10 errors when the actual situation 
00 is interpreted as 01/10. The probabilities for these 
types of errors are estimated below in a similar way 
as before [31].  
 
3.1 Probability of 11==>01/10 type errors in current-
based measurement 
We set 
0R R   and 1R R , 
with 1  . The 
mean-square channel noise current for infinite-time 
average at the 11 bit situation is given by 
2
11 ,11( ) ( )i KLJNi t S f B ,                 (2) 
where 
,11( )iS f  is the power density spectrum of the 
channel current at the bit situation 11. From Eq. (1) 
we obtain 
2
11
1
( ) 4
(1 )
eff KLJNi t kT B
R


.                         (3) 
 Figure 3 shows a block diagram for the 
measurement process at the 11 bit situation. The 
channel current first enters a squaring unit. For 
typical practical applications, the output signal is a 
voltage, because the squaring unit employs voltage-
signal-based electronics. However, for the sake 
of simplicity and without loosing generality, we 
assume that the numerical values of the voltage 
correspond to the measured current. Thus we keep 
the current-based notation as if the electronics would 
be a current-based signal system. In other words, the 
voltages are calibrated so that the numerical values 
are the same as those of the current. The numerical 
value of this instantaneous amplitude is expressed as 
2
11( )Qi t , where the constant 
1
Q
Amper
  denotes the 
transfer coefficient of the hypothetical multiplier 
device providing a volt unit also for the square value 
[37]. This instantaneous amplitude then enters an 
averaging unit and, after averaging for the finite 
duration  , the measurement result is mathematically 
expressed as 
2 2
11 11( ) ( ) ( )Qi t Qi t i t
  , where ( )i t  
is the AC component remaining after the finite-time 
average of 2
11( )Qi t . This averaging process can be 
represented as low-pass filtering with a cut-off 
frequency Bf  inversely proportional to  , i.e., 
1/Bf  . 
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Fig. 3 Measurement process at bit situation 11.  
 
denotes infinite time (exact) average, Q  is transfer 
coefficient of a hypothetical squaring device, and ( )i t   
is 
the noise component of the finite-time average of the 
square of the current. 
 
 The AC component ( )i t   of the finite-time 
average is Gaussian, which follows from the Central 
Limit Theorem because   is much larger than the 
correlation time for the AC component 
2 2
2,11 11 11( ) ( ) ( )i t Qi t Qi t   of 
2
11( )Qi t  since 
B KLJNf B . Thus the probability of the 11==>01/10 
type of errors is the probability that ( )i t  is beyond 
the threshold, i.e., 3( )i t   . This probability can be 
evaluated from the error function, but such a 
procedure requires numerical integration. However, 
one can achieve an analytic solution by using Rice’s 
formula [38, 39] of threshold crossings, as discussed 
next.  
 Rice’s formula can be employed to compute the 
mean frequency by which ( )i t  crosses the threshold 
value 3  [31]. If we define , ( )iS f  as the power 
density spectrum of ( )i t , the mean frequency of 
level crossing can be expressed as 
2
23
3 ,2 0
2
( ) exp ( )
ˆ ˆ2
if S f df
i i

 

 
   
 
 ,          (4) 
where iˆ  denotes the RMS value of ( )i t  and is 
given by 
2
,
0
ˆ ( ) ( )ii i t S f df  

   . For 
normalization purposes, we define the threshold 
value 
3  as a fraction of the measured mean-square 
channel noise current, i.e., 
2
3 11 ,11( ) ( )i KLJNQi t QS f B     , for 0 1    (5) 
The power spectral density 
,2,11( )iS f  for the AC 
component 
2,11( )i t  of 
2
11( )i t   is considered next.  
According to previous work [31, 37], and also as 
given in Fig. 4, 
,2,11( )iS f  can be written 
2 2
,2,11 ,11( ) 2 ( )(1 )
2
i KLJN i
KLJN
f
S f Q B S f
B
  , 
     for 0 2 KLJNf B  ,       
(6) 
and 
,2,11( ) 0iS f   
otherwise. The low-pass filtering 
effect of the time averaging cuts off this spectrum for 
Bf f  but keeps the ,2,11( )iS f  spectrum for Bf f . 
Considering that 
B KLJNf B , the value of ,2,11( )iS f   
can be approximated by its maximum, i.e., 
, ,2,11( ) (0)i iS f S  . Setting /KLJN BB f  , one 
obtains 
2 2 2
, ,2,11 ,11
0
ˆ ( ) (0) 2 ( )i B i B ii S f df f S Q f S f  

    
              (7) 
 
 
Fig. 4 Spectra at bit situation 11.
Bf  is the cut-off 
frequency for low-pass filtering, ,11( )iS f  and , ( )iS f  are 
power density spectra of the channel current at the bit 
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situation 11 and of the noise component ( )i t , respectively. 
The frequency for unidirectional level crossings 
3( )  , which is half of the value given by Rice’s 
formula, is 
2
23
3 ,2 0
1
( ) exp ( )
ˆ ˆ2
if S f df
i i

 



 
   
 
    ,           (8) 
where 
3 ,11( )i BQS f f   .                                       (9) 
Using Eqs. (7) and (9) one obtains 
2
3( ) exp
43
Bf  

 
   
 
.          (10) 
Thus the probability 
,11i  of the 11==>01/10 type of 
errors is 
2
3
,11 3
( ) 1
( ) exp
43
i
Bf
  
   

  
     
 
.        (11) 
 It should be noted that this error probability is an 
exponential function of the parameters   and  , 
which is consistent with earlier results [31]. The 
dependence on   shows that the error probability 
decays exponentially with increasing bit exchange 
period   . 
 
3.2 Probability of 00==>01/10 type errors in current-
based measurements 
In order to compute this probability, we introduce    
to define the threshold 
4  as a fraction of the 
measured mean-square channel noise. Thus 
2
4 00 ,00( ) ( )i KLJNQi t QS f B    ,  
for 0 1  ,                            (12) 
where 
,00 ( )iS f   is the channel noise spectrum at the 
00 bit situation.  
 Following the same procedure as above, the 
probability 
,00i  of the 00==>01/10 type of errors is 
again found to be exponentially scaling according to 
2
4
,00
( ) 1
exp
43
i
Bf
  

  
   
 
, for 0 1  .    (13) 
3.3 Illustration of results with practical parameters 
Setting 100   and 0.5  , the probability ,11i   
for 11==>01/10 type of errors is 
2
,11
1
exp 0.001
43
i
 

 
  
 
 .         (14) 
Increasing the parameter  , and consequently 
, by a factor of two reduces the error probability to 
6
,11 10i
 .    
 The bit error probability 
,00i  for the 
00==>01/10 type of errors can be computed 
analogously to the bit error probability 
,11i . In our 
case of 1  , the mean square noise level at 11 is 
much closer to the value at 01/10 than to the value at 
00 (cf., Fig. 2 as an illustration). Therefore, the bit 
error probability 
,00i  will be significantly smaller 
than the bit error probability 
,11i . This situation is 
the opposite for the case of the voltage-based method 
[31]. Accordingly the experimental test of the KLJN 
scheme [30] used either the voltage or the current 
data for decision, depending of which scheme gave 
the smaller bit error probability.  
 
4 An effective error removal method 
Below we show a new error removal strategy, 
utilizing both voltage and current measurements 
without applying any error correction algorithm, 
which is superior to the method used in earlier work 
[30].  
Let us assume that Alice and Bob measure both 
2
cu 
 and 
2
ci 
. In an ideal error-free situation, the 
same bit interpretations ensue from both mean-square 
channel noise amplitudes. However, the bit 
interpretations can differ when there are errors, 
because the current and voltage amplitudes are 
statistically independent due to the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics (cf. Eq. 6) and the Gaussian nature 
of the noises (when the crosscorrelation between two 
Gaussian processes with zero mean is zero, the two 
processes are statistically independent). To eliminate 
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errors, we select the cumulative measurement output 
that has the smallest error associated with it; see Fig. 
5 and Table 2. We make use of the fact that, in the bit 
situation when the current evaluation method has 
maximum error probability, the voltage-based 
method has minimum error probability, and vice 
versa. Figure 5 shows the three possible mean-square 
channel noise current and voltage levels. The 
threshold values 
1 , 2 , 3  and 4  again provide 
the boundaries for interpreting the measured mean-
square voltage and current values. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Mean-square channel noise measurements of current 
(a) and voltage (b). (
1 , 2 ) and ( 3 , 4 ) are the 
thresholds for interpreting the measured mean-square 
voltage and current values, respectively. ( 211( )i t 
,
2
01/10( )i t 
, 200( )i t 
) and (, 211( )u t 
 201/10( )u t 
, 200( )u t 
) 
are the mean-square channel noise current and voltage at 
the 11, 01/10 and 00 bit situations, respectively. 
 
Table 2 KLJN error removal method with combined 
current and voltage analysis. 
  Voltage measurement interpretation 
  00 11 01/10 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t 
m
ea
su
r
em
e
n
t 
in
te
r
p
re
ta
ti
o
n
 
 
00 
 
00 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
 
Discard 
(check 
attack) 
 
00 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
 
 
11 
 
Discard 
(check 
attack) 
 
11 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
 
11 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
 
01/10 
 
00 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
 
11 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
 
01/10 
(Secure) 
 
The only output that is kept is when both the 
current and voltage bit interpretations are secure, i.e., 
when both are 01/10. For instance, suppose that the 
bit interpretation obtained from the current 
measurement is 00 and that the bit interpretation for 
the voltage measurement is 01/10. In this case, we 
assume 00 as the correct bit interpretation and hence 
discard the bit.  
 
5 Error probabilities in the combined current–
voltage analysis method 
The current and voltage noises are independent as a 
consequence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
and the Gaussianity of thermal noise, [27, 29], and 
hence the probability of errors in the combined 
current–voltage analysis method is the product of the 
error probabilities of the current-based and voltage-
based methods. 
 
5.1 Probability of 00==>01/10 type errors in 
combined current–voltage analysis 
The probability 
00   of the 00==>01/10 type of errors 
in the voltage-based method is 
2
00
1
exp
43
 

 
  
 
 
for 0 1  , as reported before [31], and the 
probability 
,00i  of the 00==>01/10 type of errors in 
the current-based method is 
2
,00
1
exp
43
i
 

 
  
 
 
for 0 1  , as shown above. Thus the probability 
,00t  of the 00==>01/10 type of errors in the 
combined method is given by 
2 2
,00 00 ,00
1 ( )
exp
3 4
t i
  
  
  
   
 
  ,  
           for 0 1   and 0 1  .          (15) 
 This error probability is again an exponential 
function of the parameters. 
 
5.2 Probability of 11==>01/10 type errors in 
combined current–voltage analysis 
By following the same procedure as above, we find 
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that the probability 
,11t  of the 11==>01/10 type of 
errors in the combined voltage and current 
measurements is also exponential 
2 2
,11 11 ,11
1 ( )
exp
3 4
t i
  
  
  
   
 
,  
              for 0 1   and 0 1  .                    (16) 
 
5.3 Illustration of results with practical parameters 
To demonstrate the results for the bit error 
probability, we assign practical values to the 
parameters   ,   and  . For 100   and 
0.5   ,  we find that ,00t   is 
2 2
6
,00 00 ,00
1 ( )
exp 1.24 10
3 4
t i
  
   
  
    
 
. 
           (17) 
 If the duration of the bit exchange period, i.e.,  , 
is increased by a factor of two (meaning that the 
speed is decreased by the same factor), the total bit 
error probability 
,00t  is decreased to 
12
,00 4.6 10t
  . 
 
6 Conclusion and final remarks 
We classified and evaluated the types of errors that 
occur in the current-based scheme of the KLJN key 
exchange. These error probabilities showed an 
exponential dependence on the duration of the bit 
exchange, which is analogous to the result for the 
corresponding voltage-based scheme as discussed in 
earlier work [31].  
Furthermore, we presented an error mitigation 
strategy based on the combination of voltage-based 
and current-based schemes: only those exchanged 
bits are kept that are indicated to be secure by both 
the current and voltage methods. The resulting error 
probability of this combined strategy is the product of 
the error probabilities of the two methods, which 
follows from the statistical independence of the 
current and voltage measurements. As a 
consequence, the KLJN scheme can operate without 
error correcting algorithms, thereby preserving the 
independence of the exchanged bits of the secure key. 
Thus the key bits remain independently and 
identically distributed random variables, which is an 
important advantage for secure communication [27]. 
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